

“Riots,” Racism, and the Police

Students Explore a Century of Police Conduct and Racial Violence

BY URSULA WOLFE-ROCCA



Reuters/Lucas Jackson

Demonstration in reaction to the shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri on August 16, 2014.

POLICE VIOLENCE AGAINST BLACK PEOPLE is a fixture of students' lives in the 21st century. It is a brutal reality that my students cannot always remember which unarmed Black victim they're thinking of. I recall a discussion at the beginning of the 2019–20 school year in which one student remarked, "I mean, what about the case of Botham Jean? That dude was just standing in his grandma's backyard with his *phone*."

Actually, that was Stephon Clark.


Botham Jean was killed while eating ice cream in his own apartment by an off-duty cop who said she thought she was entering her own apartment.

My students' confusion is both understandable and horrifying. But the shamefully long list of Black people murdered by police in the last decade can also lead to a major misconception: that we're witnessing something altogether new. The oppressive and violent relationship between police and Black communities is not new. Indeed, the history of Black people in the United States is scarred by

perennial state violence. (While the focus here is on African Americans, the U.S. state has also wielded its genocidal and oppressive machinery against many others: Native Americans, Asian Americans, Latinx people, immigrants, and, of course, against countless peoples in the path of its war-making across the globe.)

I created this lesson to kick off a unit that asks "What is the function of the police? And are they serving that function?" Ultimately, the unit aims to help students articulate their own understanding of what constitutes security and safety and learn enough about the history of the police in the United States to grapple with the question of abolition versus reform. But first, I wanted students to grasp the historical magnitude of the problem, to understand that Black distrust of police is not new nor are the police practices that give rise to it.

In this lesson, students examine excerpts from three reports, written in 1922, 1968, and 2015, about three major episodes of racial violence, the



Placard from March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom in 1963.

Chicago Riot of 1919, the “long, hot summer” of 1967, and the Ferguson Uprising of 2014. Analyzing these documents does not enable students to answer the questions “What is the function of the police?” and “Do the police create conditions of safety and security?” Rather, this lesson clarifies for students the long trajectory of police violence and misconduct in Black communities, critical information for evaluating the most common proposals offered by policymakers. The older and more entrenched the problem, the more likely that quick fix reforms will fail. For example, in any inquiry into debates around police reform, students will surely encounter the notion that one solution to racist police violence is to hire more Black and People of Color cops. With these reports in hand, students may well wonder, “If the percentage of Black police officers has steadily risen over the last 100 years, but these three reports identify the same problems, then how effective are diversity initiatives in police departments?” The goal of the lesson is simple but ambitious: I want my students to recognize the continuities between past and present, better equipping them, I hope, to dream up new solutions to old — and very dangerous — problems.

Suggested Procedure

1. Tell students that they are going to look at three reports from the last 100 years and that all the reports address the same topic: the relationship between African Americans and the police. Ask students to predict how the reports will change over time. How will the relationship be described? How will each group be characterized? Ask students to jot down their guesses. Once they have some answers, ask them to think about why they answered as they did. Ask, “Why do you think the reports will change — or not change — over time? Why did you make the predictions you did?”
2. Divide students into small groups of three to four students, and assign each group one of the three documents so that there are roughly the same number of groups reading each document.
3. Tell students that some of them are reading a report from 100 years ago, some are reading a report from the late 1960s, and some are reading a report from just a few years back. But all the texts are about the same thing: the relationship between Black communities and the police. Explain that their job is to read the text a couple of times, discuss and analyze it with each other in their groups, and create a poster (digital or paper) that can provide the rest of the class a thumbnail sketch of the problems described in the report they read.
4. It is important to prepare students for the language used in the older texts. Both the 1922 and 1968 reports use the term “Negro.” My students always gasp at this word — and, indeed, it has no place in a contemporary classroom outside of the historical documents, fiction, or poetry that include it. But it *is* important that students understand that “Negro” is *not* the N-word, a misconception that many of my students hold. I have used [this short op-ed](#) by Lori L. Tharps to raise with students the history of changing racial designations for Black people. Applicable



Chicago History Museum / The Jun Fujita negatives collection

White mob running with bricks during Chicago Riot of 1919.

to this lesson in particular is the section in which she talks about W. E. B. Du Bois' entreaty to capitalize the N in "Negro," a request that was notably honored in both the 1922 and 1968 reports.

5. Give students plenty of time to digest the excerpts they've been assigned, independently and in their small groups. Encourage them to mark up the text by highlighting powerful lines or phrases and talking back to the text by writing questions and comments in the margins. As they discuss the report, ask students to consider the following questions:
 - a. What is the problem outlined in the report?
 - b. Who does the report hold responsible for the problem?
 - c. What solutions, if any, are offered or hinted at that would solve the problem?
6. Ask students, with their group mates, to choose a handful of key phrases or ideas in the text that will help their classmates (who haven't read this document) understand the report's findings. For assignments like this, I always say to students, "Your classmates need to read the SparkNotes for this text and you are in charge of writing them."
7. After students have thoroughly read and discussed their documents, give each group

a piece of poster paper (or a digital slide — Jamboard or Padlet would work well). Tell students that their poster/slide should illustrate the report's analysis of the problem. They should use words, phrases, and lines from the document, but can also provide their own commentary to help their peers better understand. Encourage students to use design and visuals to make the poster accessible and inviting — and not to overload it with text. I am a fan of giving students a strict limit on words per slide/poster, usually 100 words per slide at the outside.

8. Once all the posters/slides have been made, have students do a gallery walk and/or silent discussion. A gallery walk involves students simply walking around the room (or clicking around the digital slide deck), gathering insights and noticing patterns as they go. A silent discussion asks students to comment in writing — on the poster or slide — on what they're noticing and how they're reacting to what they're seeing. One additional thought is to ask students not to include the year the report was written on their posters. That way students can also try to guess which posters belong to which year's report.
9. After students have had a chance to take in the different posters, give them a few minutes to gather their thoughts in writing. Ask students to return to their original predictions

about how the reports would change over time. How accurate were their predictions? What else did they notice about the information in the posters? Any surprises? What did they find interesting? Disturbing? What are their takeaways?

10. Finally, ask students to share their reflections verbally with the broader class, either in a full group discussion or in small groups/breakout rooms.

The historical fables that fill most U.S. textbooks promise progress. Yes, things (enslavement, Jim Crow) were bad, but the United States is a country always improving. Little by little, this story goes, our national trajectory “bends toward justice.” But that oft- and overused line from Martin Luther King Jr. needs deeper consideration. Does the “moral arc of the universe” bend by itself? Or does it bend only through the sheer labor and will of tireless activists insisting that it give way? And what happens when it snaps back? In fact, social change is not guaranteed and it does not happen without people making it happen.

The problem with the fable of progress is that it obscures precisely what has not changed, what must still be changed, and therefore, how instrumental each of us is in ensuring change comes to pass. As Khalil Gibran Muhammad writes in his book on the history of U.S. policing, *The Condemnation of Blackness*, “If we refuse to see continuity and insist only on change, then we miss what is behind the walls of our society.”

There have always been those who could “see behind the walls,” either because they were penned by them, or because they sought and

found knowledge that broadened their vision. Indeed, the three reports included in this lesson would never have been created without the work of activists seeking a more just society. The Chicago Commission, the Kerner Commission, and the Ferguson Investigation made it clear that urban riots were caused not by Black people’s bad behavior, but by systemic failures: racist policing, an unfair justice system, histories of housing segregation and unfair lending practices, high unemployment, under-resourced schools, voter suppression — all injustices we continue to live with today. White supremacy and elite interests are hard to budge. For that, we’ll need a mass movement that has a solid grasp of history.

Once again, we are in a period of social upheaval due to racist violence. And once again, there is an opportunity to examine the problem and design solutions. Let’s not mislead our students and say we’ve not been here before. Let’s not pretend we do not know already what will happen if we do not insist on change: another police murder, another riot, another commission, another report, but no relief, no justice. This lesson seeks to confront that reality, see behind the walls of our society, and equip students to be part of bending the arc of justice anew. ❖

Ursula Wolfe-Rocca (ursula@rethinkingschools.org) has taught high school social studies since 2000. She is on the editorial board of Rethinking Schools and is a writer and organizer for the Zinn Education Project. (2020)

This lesson is offered for use in educational settings as part of the [Zinn Education Project](#), a collaboration of [Rethinking Schools](#) and [Teaching for Change](#), publishers and distributors of social justice educational materials. Contact the Zinn Education Project (zep@zinnedproject.org) directly for permission to reprint this material in course packets, newsletters, books, or other publications.

TEACHERS: We’d love your feedback after using this lesson.
Submit your reflections, student comments, modifications, questions, and more.

zinnedproject.org/share-your-story

Chicago, 1919

Background



This photograph of members of the African-American community gathering at the beach on July 27th after hearing about Eugene Williams' death is the first photograph in the report referenced on the next page, The Negro in Chicago.

July 27, 1919, was a Sunday — and it was hot. The beaches of Lake Michigan were a place for working people and their families to cool off in a time before electric air conditioning. The beaches were segregated, not by any written law, but by custom and the threat of violence. When a group of Black men and women defied the rules and tried to swim at a White beach, a White mob drove them off, throwing rocks. Black people returned with larger numbers. The White mob also grew.


Unaware of that growing mob, five Black teenagers were playing on a raft and floated into a “White” part of the lake. A White man on the shore, George Stauber, began throwing rocks at the boys. One of the teens, 17-year-old Eugene Williams, was hit in the head with a rock and drowned.

The White police officer on duty at the beach did not arrest Stauber. Hundreds of Black Chicagoans assembled and demanded the police take action against Williams’ murderer. They refused. A Black man opened fire on a group of police officers. He was immediately shot and killed, but the crowd did not disperse and other Black individuals began to attack Whites. By nightfall, rumors of “race war” in White neighborhoods ran rampant, and a “riot” was underway.

The rioting lasted almost a whole week. By the end, at least 38 people were dead (23 Black, 15 White) and more than 500 were seriously wounded. Whites looted, damaged, and burned thousands of Black homes.

In the riot’s aftermath, the governor of Illinois appointed a committee, the Chicago Commission on Race Relations, made up of six Black men and six White men, to investigate the riot and its causes in the hope of preventing something similar in the future.

Document #1



Excerpts from *The Negro in Chicago: A Study of Race Relations and a Race Riot*, by the Chicago Commission on Race Relations, 1922

... The police had two severe handicaps at the outset of the rioting. The first, as declared by Chief Garrity, was lack of sufficient numbers adequately to cope with the situation. The coroner's jury found that "the police force should be enlarged. It is too small to cope with the needs of Chicago." The grand jury added: "The police force is also inadequate in numbers, and at least one thousand (1,000) officers should be added to the existing force."

The second handicap, distrust of white policemen by all Negroes ... was frankly explained by State's Attorney Hoyne. He said before the commission: "There is no doubt that a great many police officers were grossly unfair in making arrests. They shut their eyes to offenses committed by white men while they were very vigorous in getting all the colored men they could get."

Leaders among the Negroes clearly indicate that discrimination in arrest was a principal cause of widespread and long-standing distrust. ... This distrust had grown seriously during the six months preceding the riot because no arrests were made in bombing¹ cases. State's Attorney Hoyne said before the commission: "I don't know of a single case where the police have apprehended any man who has blown up a house."

¹In the years before and after the Chicago riot, Black people's homes were targeted with racist terrorism by Whites who were angry about the increasing number of Black people moving to Chicago from the South. According to historian William M. Tuttle Jr., between 1917 and 1921, 58 Black homes were bombed, an average of one every 20 days.

Charles S. Duke, a well-educated and fair-minded Negro, gave his reaction to the bombings when he said that he did not “believe a Negro would have been allowed to go unpunished five minutes.” Mrs. Clarke, Negro, said her house was bombed three times, once while a plainclothes policeman was inside waiting for bombers, but no arrests were made. One suspect was put under surveillance but was not held.

Negro distrust of the police increased among the Negroes during the period of the riot. With each clash a new cause for suspicion seemed to spring up. The most striking instance occurred on the first afternoon when Policeman Callahan refused to arrest the white man whom the Negro crowd accused of causing the drowning of Williams, the Negro boy. This refusal has been called the beginning of the riot because it led to mob violence of grave consequences. However that may have been, the fact remains that this refusal was heralded by the Negroes as the kind of action they might expect from the police.

Typical of the minor tales that laid the foundation for the Negroes’ bitterness toward this white policeman are the following:

1. Kin Lumpkin, Negro, was beaten by a mob on the “L” platform at 47th St., as he was going home from work. The policeman arrested Lumpkin and had him booked for rioting. No other arrests were made. Lumpkin was held from July 28 to Aug. 1.
2. Two policemen, one of them Officer McCarty of the 26th Precinct, witnessed the beating of Wellington Dunmore, Negro, of 4120 South Campbell Ave., but, according to the victim, refused to assist him.
3. John Slovall and brother, Negroes, were beaten and robbed by whites in sight of a white policeman. No arrests were made. The officer did not even call for aid.

A report on 229 Negroes and whites accused of various criminal activities disclosed the fact that 154 were Negroes and 75 were whites. The state’s attorney reported 81 indictments against Negroes and 47 against whites after all riot cases were cleared up. These figures show that twice as many Negroes appeared as defendants and twice as many were indicted as whites.

At first glance these figures indicate greater riot activity on the part of Negroes, and therefore one would expect to find twice as many whites injured as Negroes. But out of a total of 520 injured persons whose race was definitely reported, 342 were Negroes and 178 whites. The fact that twice as many Negroes appeared as defendants and twice as many were injured as whites suggests the conclusion that whites were not apprehended as readily as Negroes.

The coroner’s jury on Nov. 3, 1919, reported as follows:

Our attention was called strikingly to the fact that at the time of race rioting, the arrests made for rioting by the police of colored rioters were far in excess of the arrests made of white rioters. The failure of the police to arrest impartially, at the time of rioting, whether from insufficient effort or otherwise, was a mistake and had a tendency to further incite and aggravate the colored population.

This seeming discrimination in arrests naturally deepened Negro distrust and lack of confidence in the police.

Detroit, Newark, and many other cities, 1967

Background

July and August of 1967 became known as the “long, hot summer” as dozens of mostly Black communities erupted in what some called riots and others called rebellions. Though each city and locale had its own particular set of factors that led to the uprisings, patterns were unmistakable. Uniting all the sites of rebellion were high rates of poverty, unemployment, and segregation. And according to journalists Jess Engebretson and Matthew Green, “Nearly every instance of unrest was ignited by the same kind of spark: an individual local incident involving an unarmed Black man (or men) beaten or killed by White police officers for a seemingly minor infraction.”

In Newark, New Jersey, two White police officers severely beat a Black cab driver after stopping him for a minor traffic violation. Thousands of residents poured into the streets in anger and frustration. Gov. Richard Hughes declared the unrest a “criminal insurrection by people who say they hate the white man but who really hate America,” and called up the National Guard. The rebellion lasted six days, leaving 26 people dead, many more injured, and millions of dollars in damage to neighborhoods, businesses, and homes.

Almost immediately on the heels of the uprising in Newark, a police raid on an unlicensed bar in a largely Black neighborhood in Detroit set off what is considered the bloodiest moment of the summer. The uprising lasted for five days. The governor sent in the National Guard, the president sent in the U.S. Army. In the end, there were 43 dead, 1,189 injured, more than 7,200 arrests, and thousands of buildings destroyed.

Following the “long, hot summer” of 1967, President Lyndon Johnson constituted the Kerner Commission to identify the causes of the unrest that had killed close to 100 people. The members of the commission were mostly government officials, with a few exceptions. Of the 12 members, nine were White men, two were Black men, and one was a White woman.

Document #2

Document #2: Excerpts from *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders*, by the Kerner Commission, 1968

We have cited deep hostility between police and ghetto communities as a primary cause of the disorders surveyed by the Commission. In Newark, in Detroit, in Watts, in Harlem — in practically every city that has experienced racial disruption since the summer of 1964 — abrasive relationships between police and Negroes and other minority groups have been a major source of grievance, tension and, ultimately, disorder.

In a fundamental sense, however, it is wrong to define the problem solely as hostility to police. In many ways the policeman only symbolizes much deeper problems.

The policeman in the ghetto is a symbol not only of law, but of the entire system of law enforcement and criminal justice.

As such, he becomes the tangible target for grievances against shortcomings throughout that system: against assembly-line justice in teeming lower courts; against wide disparities in sentences; against antiquated corrections facilities; against the basic inequities imposed by the system on the poor — to whom, for example, the option of bail means only jail.

The policeman in the ghetto is a symbol of increasingly bitter social debate over law enforcement.

One side, disturbed and perplexed by sharp rises in crime and urban violence, exerts extreme pressure on police for tougher law enforcement. Another group, inflamed against police as agents of repression, tends toward defiance of what it regards as order maintained at the expense of justice.

The policeman in the ghetto is the most visible symbol, finally, of a society from which many ghetto Negroes are increasingly alienated.

As Dr. Kenneth B. Clark told the commission:

This society knows . . . that if human beings are confined in ghetto compounds of our cities, and are subjected to criminally inferior education, pervasive economic and job discrimination, committed to houses unfit for human habitation, subjected to unspeakable conditions of municipal services, such as sanitation, that such human beings are not likely to be responsive to appeals to be lawful, to be respectful, to be concerned with property of others.

And yet, precisely because the policeman in the ghetto is a symbol — precisely because he symbolizes so much — it is of critical importance that the police and society take every possible step to allay grievances that flow from a sense of injustice and increased tension and turmoil.



In this work, the police bear a major responsibility for making needed changes.

... Negroes firmly believe that police brutality and harassment occur repeatedly in Negro neighborhoods. This belief is unquestionably one of the major reasons for intense Negro resentment against the police.

... Physical abuse is only one source of aggravation in the ghetto. In nearly every city surveyed, the commission heard complaints of harassment of interracial couples, dispersal of social street gatherings, and the stopping of Negroes on foot or in cars without obvious basis. These, together with contemptuous and degrading verbal abuse, have great impact in the ghetto. As one commission witness said, these strip the Negro of the one thing that he may have left — his dignity, “the question of being a man.”



Chicago Urban League Photos/University of Illinois at Chicago

Dr. Kenneth B. Clark

... Although police administrators may take steps to attempt to eliminate misconduct by individual police officers, many departments have adopted patrol practices that in the words of one commentator have “... replaced harassment by individual patrolmen with harassment by entire departments.”

These practices, sometimes known as “aggressive preventive patrol,” take a number of forms, but invariably they involve a large number of police-citizen contacts initiated by police rather than in response to a call for help or service . . .

The strength of ghetto feelings about hostile police conduct may even be exceeded by the conviction that ghetto neighborhoods are not given adequate police protection.

This belief is founded on two basic types of complaint. The first is that the police maintain a much less rigorous standard of law enforcement in the ghetto, tolerating there illegal activities like drug addiction, prostitution, and street violence that they would not tolerate elsewhere. The second is that police treat complaints and calls for help from Negro areas much less urgently than from white areas. These perceptions are widespread.


The report of a New Haven community group summarizes the complaints:

- When calls for help are registered, it is all too frequent that police respond too slowly or not at all...
- When they do come, [they] arrive with many more men and cars than are necessary . . . brandishing guns and adding to the confusion.

Ghetto residents . . . see a dual standard of law enforcement. Particularly because many work in other areas of the city and have seen the nature of police responsiveness there, they are keenly aware of the difference. They come to believe that an assault on a white victim produces one reaction and an assault on a Negro quite another.

Ferguson, Missouri, 2014

Background



JustSeeds/artist Nicolas Lambert

"Is Ferguson in America" is a reference to the "Is Colorado in America" poster about the Ludlow Massacre in 1914 — another example of state violence.

In August of 2014, police confronted an 18-year-old Black man, Michael Brown, for walking in the street with his friend. The accounts of the White police officer, Darren Wilson, and Brown's friend, Dorian Johnson, differ about what happened next, but at some point, both Johnson and Brown tried to run away, and Wilson shot his gun. Wilson shot Michael Brown six times, and killed Brown. His body was left lying — and bleeding — in the street for more than four hours.

As the story of Brown's death circulated through the city, vigils and protests began. These protests became part of the wider #BlackLivesMatter movement, calling for an end to police brutality and state-sanctioned violence against Black people. Protests went on for weeks, drawing supporters from all over the country, but also a heavily militarized response from local police and government. Social media feeds and news-casts featured violent clashes between demonstrators and police, who used tear gas and armored vehicles intended for war zones. Violence and unrest flared up again in Ferguson in November 2014 when the state announced that the government would bring no charges against Darren Wilson.

In response to the shooting and subsequent uprising, the U.S. Department of Justice conducted an investigation into the practices of the Ferguson Police Department. Federal investigators published their findings in 2015.

Document #3

Excerpts from *Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department*, by the United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, 2015.

The unlawful police misconduct and court practices described above have generated great distrust of Ferguson law enforcement, especially among African Americans. . . . Together, these practices severely damaged the relationship between African Americans and the Ferguson Police Department long before Michael Brown's shooting death in August 2014. This divide has made policing in Ferguson less effective, more difficult, and more likely to discriminate.

In the documents we reviewed, the meetings we observed and participated in, and in the hundreds of conversations Civil Rights Division staff had with residents of Ferguson and the surrounding area, many residents, primarily African American residents, described being belittled, disbelieved, and treated with little regard for their legal rights by the Ferguson Police Department. One white individual who has lived in Ferguson for 48 years told us that it feels like Ferguson's police and court system is "designed to bring a Black man down . . . [there are] no second chances." We heard from African American residents who told us of Ferguson's "long history of targeting Blacks for harassment and degrading treatment," and who described the steps they take to avoid this — from taking routes to work that skirt Ferguson to moving out of state. An African American minister of a church in a nearby community told us that he doesn't allow his two sons to drive through Ferguson out of "fear that they will be targeted for arrest."

African Americans' views of FPD are shaped not just by *what* FPD officers do, but by *how* they do it. During our investigation, dozens of African Americans in Ferguson told us of verbal abuse by FPD officers during routine interactions, and these accounts are consistent with complaints people have made about FPD for years. In December 2011, for example, an African American man alleged that as he was standing outside of Wal-Mart, an officer called him a "stupid motherf****r" and a "bastard." According to the man, a lieutenant was on the scene and did nothing to reproach the officer, instead threatening to arrest the man. . . . In June 2011, a 60-year-old man complained that an officer verbally harassed him while he stood in line to see the judge in municipal court. According to the man, the officer repeatedly ordered him to move forward as the line advanced and, because he did not advance far enough, turned to the other court-goers and joked, "He is hooked on phonics."

Another concern we heard from many African American residents, and saw in the files we reviewed, was of casual intimidation by FPD officers, including threats to draw or fire their weapons, often for seemingly little or no cause. In September 2012, a 28-year resident of Ferguson complained to FPD about a traffic stop during which a lieutenant approached with a loud and confrontational manner with his hand on his holstered gun. The resident, who had a military police background, noted that the lieutenant's behavior, especially having his hand on his gun, ratcheted up the tension level, and he questioned why the lieutenant had been so aggressive . . .

Even where lawful, many discretionary FPD enforcement actions increase distrust and significantly decrease the likelihood that individuals will seek police assistance even when they are victims of crime, or that they will cooperate with the police to solve or prevent other crimes . . .

In one instance, for example, a woman called FPD to report a domestic disturbance. By the time the police arrived, the woman's boyfriend had left. The police looked through the house and saw indications that the boyfriend lived there. When the woman told police that only she and her brother were listed on the home's occupancy permit, the officer placed the woman under arrest for the permit violation and she was jailed. In another instance, after a woman called police to report a domestic disturbance and was given a summons for an occupancy permit violation, she said, according to the officer's report, that she "hated the Ferguson Police Department and will never call again, even if she is being killed."

We also reviewed many instances in which FPD officers arrested individuals who sought to care for loved ones who had been hurt. In one instance from May 2014, for example, a man rushed to the scene of a car accident involving his girlfriend, who was badly injured and bleeding profusely when he arrived. He approached and tried to calm her. When officers arrived they treated him rudely, according to the man, telling him to move away from his girlfriend, which he did not want to do. They then immediately proceeded to handcuff and arrest him, which, officers assert, he resisted. EMS and other officers were not on the scene during this arrest, so the accident victim remained unattended, bleeding from her injuries, while officers were arresting the boyfriend. Officers charged the man with five municipal code violations (resisting arrest, disorderly conduct, assault on an officer, obstructing government operations, and failure to comply) and had his vehicle towed and impounded.

Rather than view these instances as opportunities to convey their compassion for individuals at times of crisis even as they maintain order, FPD appears instead to view these and similar incidents we reviewed as opportunities to issue multiple citations and make arrests. For very little public safety benefit, FPD loses opportunities to build community trust and respect, and instead further alienates potential allies in crime prevention.